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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the problems of standard adversarial accuracy and standard adversarial training
method. We argue that standard adversarial accuracy fails to properly measure the robustness of
classifiers. The definition allows overlaps in regions for clean samples and adversarial examples.
Thus, there is a trade-off between accuracy and standard adversarial accuracy. Hence, using standard
adversarial training can result in lowered accuracy. Also, standard adversarial accuracy can favor
classifiers with more invariance-based adversarial examples, samples whose predicted classes are
unchanged even if the perceptual classes are changed.
In this paper, we introduce a new measure for the robustness of classifiers called genuine adversarial
accuracy in order to handle the problems of the standard adversarial accuracy. It can measure
adversarial robustness of classifiers without the trade-off between accuracy on clean data and
adversarially perturbed samples. In addition, it doesn’t favor a model with invariance-based
adversarial examples.
We show that a single nearest neighbor (1-NN) classifier is the most robust classifier according to
genuine adversarial accuracy for given data and a metric when exclusive belongingness assumption is
used. This result provides a fundamental step to train adversarially robust classifiers.
Keywords adversarial robustness · adversarial training · genuine adversarial accuracy · nearest neighbor classifier
1 Introduction
Even though deep learning models have shown promising performances in image classification tasks [1], most
deep learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial attackers. By applying a carefully crafted, but imperceptible
perturbation to input images, so-called adversarial examples can be constructed that cause the classifier to misclassify
the perturbed inputs [2]. These vulnerabilities have been shown to be exploitable even when printed adversarial images
were read through a camera [3]. Adversarial examples for a specific classifier can be transferable to other models [4].
The transferability of adversarial examples [5] enables attackers to exploit vulnerabilities even with limited access to
the target classifier.
Problem setting. In a clean input set X ⊂ Rd, let every sample x exclusively belong to one of the classes Y , and
their classes will be denoted as cx. A classifier f assigns a class label from Y for each sample x ∈ Rd. Assume f is
parameterized by θ and L(θ, x, y) is the cross-entropy loss of the classifier provided the input x and the label y ∈ Y .
Note that this exclusive belongingness assumption is introduced to simplify the analysis. Otherwise, it is hard to
rigorously define the adversarial examples. This assumption can be unrealistic in practice. In a real situation, 1) input
information might not be enough to perfectly predict the class, 2) input samples might contain noises which erase class
information, 3) some input samples might be better to give non-exclusive class (see Figure 1), or 4) sometimes labels
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Figure 1: Examples of confusing near image pairs with different classes of MNIST training dataset [6]. The l2 norms of
the pairs are 2.399, 3.100 and 3.131 from left to right. From these examples, we can say the exclusive belongingness
assumption may not be realistic.
might also contain some noises due to mistakes. One needs to be careful that using exclusive (hard) labels doesn’t
necessarily satisfy the exclusive belongingness assumption. That is because it is possible that exclusive labels are used
to ease annotation processes even though such processes might ignore the existing ambiguity of inputs.
1.1 Adversarial examples
Definition 1 (Adversarial Example). Given a clean sample x ∈ X and a maximum permutation norm (threshold) ,
a perturbed sample x′ is an adversarial example if ‖ x− x′‖ ≤  and f(x′) 6= cx [7].
1.2 Standard adversarial accuracy
The following measure is commonly used for comparing different classifiers on vulnerability to adversarial attacks
[8–11].
Definition 2 (Standard adversarial accuracy). We define standard adversarial accuracy for a classifier f by maximum
perturbation norm. Note that 1 () is an indicator function which has value 1 if the condition in the bracket holds and
value 0 if the condition in the bracket doesn’t hold.
Then, standard adversarial accuracy (by maximum perturbation norm) astd;max() is defined as follows.
• astd;max() = Ex∈X [1 (f(x∗) = cx)] where x∗ = argmax
x′:‖x′−x‖≤
L(θ, x′, cx).
Notice that astd;max() is based on maximum perturbation norm. In other words, in x∗, x′ need to satisfy
∥∥∥x′ − x∥∥∥ ≤ .
1.2.1 One-dimensional toy example
Even though (standard) adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm is commonly used as a measure of
adversarial robustness [8–11], it is not clear whether this measure can be used to choose better models. To show this
measure is not an appropriate measure of robustness, we introduce the following example.
Let’s consider a toy example (see Figure 2) with predefined (pre-known) classes in order to simplify the analysis. There
are only two classes −1 and 1, i.e. Y = {−1, 1}, and 1-dimensional clean input set X = [−2,−1) ∪ [1, 2) ⊆ R.
cx = −1 when x ∈ [−2,−1) and cx = 1 when x ∈ [1, 2). p(c = −1) = p(c = 1) = 12 , i.e. we assume uniform prior
probability.
Let’s define three classifiers f1, f2 and f3 for this toy example (see Figure 3). When step function step(x) is defined
as step(x) =
{
1, if x ≥ 0,
−1, if x < 0 , let f1(x) = step(x − 1), f2(x) = 1 − step(x + 4) + step(x), and f3(x) = step(x).
Notice that accuracy for all three classifiers is 1. However, f1 will not be robust against adversarial attacks as points
in [1, 1 + ) can be perturbed to change their classification result. f2 is overly invariant when x < −4. The oracle
classifier will be f3.
When the change of standard adversarial accuracies by maximum perturbation norm  were considered (see the graphs
2
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Figure 2: Plots of p(x|c = −1): red and p(x|c = 1): blue for first toy example.
0 1
−1
1
f1(x)
x
−4 0 1
−1
1
f2(x)
x
0 1
−1
1
f3(x)
x
Figure 3: Plots of three classifiers. Top: f1(x) = step(x− 1), Middle: f2(x) = 1− step(x+ 4) + step(x), Bottom:
f3(x) = step(x) where step(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0 and step(x) = −1 for x < 0.
on the left-side in Figure 4), f1 shows decreasing (standard) adversarial accuracy even when  < 1. However, f2 and f3
are equally robust according to this measure. Thus, maximum norm-based standard adversarial accuracy function can
not tell which classifier is better. (In addition, f1, f2 and f3 have the same Accuracy-Robustness Area (ARA) [12],
which measures the area under the curve for adversarial accuracy plot, that is 1.5. This example shows that ARA is also
not a reliable measure for the robustness of classifiers.)
As standard adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm failed to tell which classifier is better, we
try to use a variant of it. In the definition of astd;max(), we only change the constrain of x′ such that it satisfies∥∥∥x′ − x∥∥∥ = . We call this standard adversarial accuracy by exact perturbation norm and denote as astd; exact().
Using exact perturbation norm-based standard adversarial accuracies gives further distinction as shown in the right-side
of the graphs in Figure 4. However, f2 is more robust than f3 according to this measure. This example shows that exact
norm-based standard adversarial accuracy can favor invariance even though such invariance will not occur on the oracle
model. In other words, it can favor classifiers with invariance-based adversarial examples [13] and it can’t be a reliable
measure for the robustness.
1.3 Adversarial training
Adversarial training [4] was developed to avoid the adversarial vulnerability of a classifier. It tries to reduce
the weighted summation of standard loss (empirical risk) E [L(θ, x, y)] and adversarial loss E [L(θ, x′, y)], i.e.
αE [L(θ, x, y)] + (1− α)E [L(θ, x′, y)] where α is a hyperparameter for adversarial training, and x′ is an adversarially
perturbed sample from x with ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ . (Usually, α = 0.5 is used for adversarial training.) By considering
both standard and adversarially perturbed samples, adversarial training try to increase accuracies on both clean and
adversarially perturbed samples. In the literature on adversarial training, inner maximization of a classifier refers to
generating adversarial attacks, i.e. generating adversarially perturbed samples x∗ that maximally increases the loss.
And outer minimization refers to minimizing the adversarial loss of the model. Madry et al. [14] explained that inner
maximization and outer minimization of the loss can train models that are robust against adversarial attacks.
However, there is a trade-off between accuracy on clean data and adversarially perturbed samples [15–17]. Hence, when
we used adversarial training [4], we can get a classifier whose accuracy is lower than using standard (non-adversarial)
training method [15, 18]. Also, Jacobson et al. [13] studied samples whose perceptual classes are changed due to
3
Proper measure for adversarial robustness A PREPRINT
1 2 3
0.5
1

astd;max()
1 2 3
0.5
1

astd; exact()
1 2
1

astd;max()
1 2 5 6
1

astd; exact()
1 2
1

astd;max()
1 2
1

astd; exact()
Figure 4: Top: Change of (standard) adversarial accuracy for f1(x) by maximum perturbation norm (left) and exact
perturbation norm (right),
Middle: Change of (standard) adversarial accuracy for f2(x) by maximum perturbation norm (left) and exact perturba-
tion norm (right),
Bottom: Change of (standard) adversarial accuracy for f3(x) by maximum perturbation norm (left) and exact perturba-
tion norm (right).
Observed behaviors of f2 and f3 will be same when we compare the adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation
norm , however, observed behaviors of f2 and f3 are different when we compare the adversarial accuracy by exact
perturbation norm.
perturbation, but not in the model’s prediction, what they called "invariance-based adversarial examples". (These
samples are also called "type I errors" [19] or "invalid adversarial examples" [20].) They found that classifiers
trained with adversarial training can be more susceptible to invariance-based adversarial examples. Recently, further
research showed that there is a fundamental trade-off between adversarial examples [7] and invariance-based adversarial
examples [21].
1.3.1 Sunset dataset
We introduce a binary classification problem called sunset dataset. This artificial dataset shows the limitation of
standard adversarial accuracy and standard adversarial training method [4] that is intended to maximize standard
adversarial accuracy.
This artificial dataset contains uncountably many points. One class (class A) of dataset is consists of points
on a hypersphere. The other class (class B) is consist of points on a hyperplane contacting with the hypersphere. One
important character of this dataset is that infimum of the nearest distance between the two classes is 0.
A two-dimensional sunset dataset is visualized in Figure 5. In that dataset, we can think of a classifier that
classifies points inside the circle classified as class A and class B otherwise. The accuracy of the classifier is 1. However,
if the maximum perturbation norm  > 0, the classifier will always have adversarial examples [8]. For example, point
(0, 2 + ) is an adversarial example as it is classified as class B according to the classifier and (0, 2) has class A. If we
try to use adversarial training, we encounter the problem where point (, 1−√1− 2) (or (1,1) when  ≥ 1), which is
on the red circle, can also be considered as an adversarial example originated from (, 0). (We are considering l2 norm
robustness. Visualized points are based on  = 0.5) If we change the classes of these points to remove adversarial
examples [7], we simultaneously introduce invariance-based adversarial examples [13] on the classifier. If one chooses
robust classifiers based on standard adversarial accuracy with  > 0, one would choose classifiers with invariance-based
adversarial examples over the oracle classifier (mentioned in Figure 5). In other words, standard adversarial accuracy
can favor classifiers with more invariance-based adversarial examples [13].
4
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Figure 5: Two-dimensional sunset dataset class A: red and class B: blue. The colored figure shows that the points on
class A resemble the shape of the sun and the points on class B resemble the shape of the horizon.
When we consider l2 norm robustness, the decision boundary of the oracle classifier for this example will be a parabola
which satisfies x2 = 14x
2
1 where x1 and x2 represent the first and second axes. That is shown as dashed black curve.
Every point in this parabola has same distance to the nearest sample in class A and B.
2 Genuine adversarial accuracy
Definition 3 (Genuine adversarial accuracy). We define genuine adversarial accuracy that uses exact perturba-
tion norm. Note that 1 () is an indicator function which has value 1 if the condition in the bracket holds and
value 0 if the condition in the bracket doesn’t hold. The complement set of a set S will be denoted as Sc. X¯
is the topological closure of X , i.e. union of X and its boundary. Voronoi boundary V B(X ) is defined as{
x′ ∈ Rd|∃x1, x2 ∈ X¯ : x1 6= x2, ‖x′ − x1‖ = ‖x′ − x2‖
}
. Previously allowed perturbation region X is defined
as
{
x′ ∈ V B(X )c| ‖x′ − x‖ <  where x ∈ X¯}.
Then, genuine adversarial accuracy (by exact perturbation norm) agen; exact() is defined as follows.
• agen; exact() = Ex∈Sexact() [1 (f(x∗) = cx)]
where Sexact() =
{
x ∈ X¯ |∃x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c : ‖x′ − x‖ = 
}
and x∗ = argmax
x′∈X c∩V B(X )c:‖x′−x‖=
L(θ, x′, cx) when  > 0.
• agen; exact(0) = Ex∈X [1 (f(x) = cx)] when  = 0.
The reason for proposing genuine adversarial accuracy is to avoid using a point x′ ∈ Rd more than once when
calculating the robustness of a classifier. That is shown in theorem 1. X¯ is used instead of X because using X can
ignore many points in the calculation of robustness (see an example in subsection 8.1). Voronoi boundary V B(X ) is
used in the calculation as points on this set can be approached from two different points in X¯ with the same distance,
and these points need to be ignored in order to avoid conflicts when measuring adversarial accuracy. Previously allowed
perturbation region X is used to ignore this region for given . In the calculation of the expected value, Sexact() is
used because there may be no x′ that satisfies new constrain.
Figure 6 shows the result of using genuine adversarial accuracy on the one-dimensional toy example in subsection 1.2.1.
According to this measure, f3 is the most robust classifier for given data and that is consistent with the oracle classifier.
Theorem 1. Genuine adversarial accuracy only use each point only once to calculate adversarial accuracy. In other
words, it doesn’t allow overlaps.
Proof. Part 1
First, we prove that the regions of points will be used for calculation of genuine adversarial accuracy for different 
values have no intersection.
Let Rgen;exact() =
{{
x′ ∈ R| ‖x′ − x‖ =  where x ∈ X¯} ∩ X c ∩ V B(X )c, when  > 0,
X , when  = 0 . Rgen;exact() is the
5
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Figure 6: Top: Change of genuine adversarial accuracy agen; exact() for f1(x) by exact perturbation norm ,
Middle: Change of genuine adversarial accuracy agen; exact() for f2(x) by exact perturbation norm ,
Bottom: Change of genuine adversarial accuracy agen; exact() for f3(x) by exact perturbation norm .
Details for calculation is explained in the supplementary section 8.1.
region of points that will be used for calculating genuine adversarial accuracy for .
We need to prove the following.
1 6= 2 =⇒ Rgen;exact(1) ∩Rgen;exact(2) = ∅ (1)
Let x′ ∈ Rgen;exact(1), Rgen;exact(2) for 1 6= 2.
First, we consider when 1, 2 > 0.
Then, ∃x1 ∈ X¯ : ‖x′ − x1‖ = 1 and ∃x2 ∈ X¯ : ‖x′ − x2‖ = 2.
If x1 = x2, then ‖x′ − x1‖ = 1 6= 2 = ‖x′ − x1‖. It is a contradiction.
We now consider the case when x1 6= x2. Without loss of generality, we can assume 1 < 2.
As x′ ∈ Rgen;exact(2), x′ ∈ X c2 ∩ V B(X )c.
∀xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′ − xclean‖ ≥ 2 and x′ ∈ V B(X )c (∵ Equation (4) of lemma 2 in the supplementary section 8.2)
As x1 ∈ X¯ , ‖x′ − x1‖ = 1 ≥ 2 and it is a contradiction. Hence, there is no x′ that satisfies x′ ∈ Rgen;exact(1) and
x′ ∈ Rgen;exact(2).
Prove for (1 = 0, 2 > 0) ∨ (1 > 0, 2 = 0) can be done similarly, and we finished the prove for statement (1).
Part 2
Now, we prove that the regions of points will be used for different x ∈ Sexact() have no intersection.
Let Rgen;exact(;x) =
{{x′ ∈ R| ‖x′ − x‖ = } ∩ X c ∩ V B(X )c, when  > 0,
{x} , when  = 0 .
We need to prove the following.
x1 6= x2 =⇒ Rgen;exact(;x1) ∩Rgen;exact(;x2) = ∅ (2)
This is obvious when  = 0 as Rgen;exact(0;x1) = {x1} and Rgen;exact(0;x2) = {x2}.
We consider when  > 0.
Let x′ ∈ Rgen;exact(;x1), Rgen;exact(;x2) for x1 6= x2. Then, ‖x′ − x1‖ =  = ‖x′ − x2‖ and x′ ∈ V B(X ).
However, as x′ ∈ Rgen;exact(;x1), x′ ∈ V B(X )c. It is a contradiction, and Rgen;exact(;x1) ∩ Rgen;exact(;x2)
needs to be ∅. We finished the prove for statement 2.
Because of statements 1 and 2, there will be no overlap when we choose different  or different x ∈ Sexact(), and thus
we proved the theorem 1.
The theorem 1 indicates that genuine adversarial accuracy avoids the trade-off between accuracy and (genuine)
adversarial accuracy. Also, it no longer favors a classifier with excessive invariance, which indicates that it does not
6
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favor a classifier with invariance-based adversarial examples [13]. The fact that it doesn’t allow overlaps is also
matching with our intuitive understanding of the robust classification.
3 A single nearest neighbor (1-NN) classifier is the classifier that maximizes genuine
adversarial accuracy
Here, we prove that actually a single nearest neighbor (1-NN) classifier is the classifier that maximizes genuine
adversarial accuracy.
Theorem 2. A single nearest neighbor (1-NN) classifier maximizes genuine adversarial accuracy, and it is the almost
everywhere unique classifier that satisfies this except for X¯ − X and Voronoi boundary V B(X ).
Proof. Part 1
First, we prove that a 1-NN classifier maximizes genuine adversarial accuracy. We denote the 1-NN classifier as
f1−NN .
When  = 0, agen; exact(0) = Ex∈X [1 (f1−NN (x) = cx)] = Ex∈X [1] = 1.
When  > 0, let x ∈ Sexact().
Then, ∃x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c : ‖x′ − x‖ = .
x′,∀xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′ − xclean‖ ≥  and x′ ∈ V B(X )c (∵ Equivalence relation (4) in the supplementary section 8.2)
Because of that and ‖x′ − x‖ = , x and x′ are nearest neighbors. Thus, f1−NN (x′) = cx. As x∗ is a special case for
x′, f1−NN (x∗) = cx and 1 (f1−NN (x∗) = cx) = 1.
Hence, agen; exact() = 1 and f1−NN maximizes genuine adversarial accuracy.
Part 2
Now, we prove that if f∗ maximizes genuine adversarial accuracy, then f∗ becomes a 1-NN classifier (almost
everywhere) except for X¯ − X and Voronoi boundary V B(X ). As we know that a 1-NN classifier maximizes genuine
adversarial accuracy from part 1, we only need to show that f∗ is almost everywhere unique (except for X¯ − X and
Voronoi boundary V B(X ) ).
Let f∗1 be a function that maximizes genuine adversarial accuracy.
When  = 0, Ex∈X [1 (f1−NN (x) = cx)] = 1 = Ex∈X
[
1
(
f∗1(x) = cx
)]
. We get 1
(
f∗1(x) = cx
)
= 1
almost everywhere for x ∈ X . It is equivalent to f∗1(x) = cx = f1−NN (x) almost everywhere for x ∈ X .
When  > 0, let x ∈ Sexact().
With similar process when  = 0, we get f∗1(x∗) = cx and f1−NN (x∗∗) = cx almost everywhere for x ∈ Sexact().
As x∗ and x∗∗ are worst case adversarially perturbed samples, i.e. samples that output mostly different from cx,
f∗1(x′) = cx and f1−NN (x′′) = cx almost everywhere where x′, x′′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c, ‖x′ − x‖ =  = ‖x′′ − x‖.
We can consider when x′ = x′′ and we get f∗1(x′) = cx = f1−NN (x′) almost everywhere where
x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c, ‖x′ − x‖ = .
By changing , x′ that satisfies x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c and ‖x′ − x‖ =  can fill up Rd − X¯ except for V B(X ) (∵
Lemma 3 in the supplementary section 8.2.). Hence, f∗1 is almost everywhere same with f1−NN except for X¯ − X
and Voronoi boundary V B(X ).
It is important to notice that the theorem 2 doesn’t imply that a 1-NN classifier based on training data will be optimally
robust on the test data. That is because exclusive belongingness assumption can be violated in practice. The theorem
can also mean that for a given data and metric, a 1-NN classifier will be the optimally robust classifier on the same data.
When test data were considered, a 1-NN classifier on that test data will achieve optimal robustness. Thus, if we want
our trained classifier to be robust on test data, we need to use some training method to make it behave like a 1-NN
classifier on test data only using training data.
4 Related works
Khoury and Hadfield-Menell [22] showed that 1-NN classifiers can use exponentially fewer samples than standard
adversarial training [4] to correctly classifies samples on the tubular neighborhood. Our work differs from their work as
7
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we showed that not only 1-NN classifiers are more robust to adversarial examples than classifiers trained by standard
adversarial training when we assume exclusive belongingness, but also they are actually optimally robust. The authors
also suggested an improved adversarial training method that uses Voronoi cell constrains instead of ‖·‖-ball constrains.
Even though our work showed a 1-NN classifier will be the optimally robust classifier on the same data, we know
the well-known limitation of nearest neighbor classifier: limited generalization power. By applying their adversarial
training method, we can train hybrid models that have the architecture of neural networks and similar properties of
1-NN classifiers. Such models would generalize well when proper network architectures were used and robust as they
mimic 1-NN classifiers.
5 Conclusion
Even though standard adversarial examples are commonly used for measuring the robustness of classifiers [8–11], it has
problems that it allows overlapping regions. In this work, we introduce genuine adversarial accuracy that avoids such a
problem. Hence, genuine adversarial accuracy doesn’t have the trade-off between accuracy and genuine adversarial
accuracy unlike standard adversarial accuracy [15–17]. This implies that properly applied adversarial training, i.e.
adversarial training with Voronoi constraints [22], can be applied without worrying about reduced accuracy. Genuine
adversarial accuracy ignores adversarial examples [8] when applied perturbations are large enough to change classes of
a classifier (1-NN classifier). Hence, it doesn’t favor a classifier with invariance-based adversarial examples [13]. These
excellences of genuine adversarial accuracy suggest that graphs of genuine adversarial accuracies of classifiers need to
be used for evaluating the robustness of classifiers. (In practice, it’s hard to calculate genuine adversarial accuracy by
exact perturbation norm. However, one can use genuine adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm explained
in the supplementary section 8.3.)
Furthermore, by assuming exclusive belongingness, we prove that a single nearest neighbor (1-NN) classi-
fier is the most robust classifier according to genuine adversarial accuracy for given data and a metric. This result
provides a fundamental step to end the arms race between adversarial attacks and defenses. It suggests that adversarial
training with Voronoi constraints [22] would train hybrid models that seek optimal robustness on the training data.
6 Future work
A single nearest neighbor (1-NN) is known to have limited generalization power especially when the training dataset is
noisy. Our analysis is based on the assumption that data contain no noise. We also need similar analyses when data
contain various noise. (The supplementary section 8.4 shows optimally robust classifiers when data contain additive
input noise.) We need to generalize genuine adversarial accuracy for such cases.
As pointed out by researchers [23], attackers can try different types of attacks to exploit from models. In
addition, we want to learn a classifier that is robust against various perceptual changes like rotation, shift [24], scaling,
spatial transformation [25], texture [26], etc. of images. From the theorem 2, we know that there will be (almost
everywhere) unique optimally robust classifier for a given data and a metric. Thus, in order to train a classifier that is
robust against various attacks and has human-like robustness, the first step we need to make is to define a metric that
captures various changes of images.
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8 Supplementary
8.1 Calculation of genuine adversarial accuracy on one-dimensional toy example
Here, we explain the calculation of genuine adversarial accuracies for f1(x), f2(x) and f3(x) (see Fig-
ure 6). Voronoi boundary V B(X ) = {0}. When 0 <  < 1, previously allowed perturbation region
X = (−2− ,−1 + ) ∪ (1− , 2 + ) and Sexact() = {−2,−1, 1, 2}. When  ≥ 1, previously allowed
perturbation region X = (−2− , 0) ∪ (0, 2 + ) and Sexact() = {−2, 2}. For calculation of genuine adversarial
accuracies, we will consider four points −2 − ,−1 + , 1 −  and 2 +  when 0 <  < 1, and two points
−2 −  and 2 +  when  ≥ 1. If we use the definition of Rgen;exact() introduced in the proof of theorem
1, Rgen;exact() = {−2− ,−1 + , 1− , 2 + } when 0 <  < 1, and Rgen;exact() = {−2− , 2 + }
when  ≥ 1. Note that if we did not use closure X¯ in the definition of Sexact(), Sexact() = {−2, 1} and
we will only consider points −2 −  and 1 −  when 0 <  < 1, and Sexact() = {−2} and we will only con-
sider one point−2−when  ≥ 1. This will ignore many points and can not measure the proper robustness of classifiers.
In the change of genuine adversarial accuracy for f1(x) (shown in Figure 6), when 0 <  < 1, points
−2− , −1 +  and a point 2 +  will be non-adversarial perturbed samples and 1−  will be adversarial example, and
thus agen;exact() = 34 = 0.75. When  ≥ 1, points −2−  and 2 +  will be non-adversarial perturbed samples, and
thus its genuine adversarial accuracy is 1.
When considering the change of genuine adversarial accuracy for f2(x) (shown in Figure 6), for 0 <  < 1,
points −2− , −1 + , 1−  and 2 +  will be non-adversarial perturbed samples, and thus agen;exact() = 1. When
1 ≤  ≤ 2, points −2−  and 2 +  will be non-adversarial perturbed samples, and thus agen;exact() = 1. However,
when  > 2, only one point 2 +  will be non-adversarial perturbed samples and the other point −2 −  will be
adversarial example, and thus agen;exact() = 12 = 0.5.
Through a similar process, one can understand the change of genuine adversarial accuracy for f3(x).
8.2 Lemmas used in the proof of theorems
Lemma 1. Let A =
{
x′′ ∈ Rd|∃xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′′ − xclean‖ < 
}
.
Then, the following holds.
Xc ∩ V B(X )c = Ac ∩ V B(X )c (3)
Proof. X = A ∩ V B(X )c.
Xc ∩ V B(X )c = (Ac ∪ V B(X )) ∩ V B(X )c (∵ De Morgan’s law)
= (Ac ∩ V B(X )c) ∪ (V B(X ) ∩ V B(X )c) (∵ Distributive law)
= (Ac ∩ V B(X )c) ∪∅ = Ac ∩ V B(X )c
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Lemma 2. If  > 0, then the following holds.
x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c ⇐⇒ x′,∀xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′ − xclean‖ ≥  and x′ ∈ V B(X )c (4)
Proof.
x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c ⇐⇒ x′ ∈ Ac ∩ V B(X )c (∵ Equation (3) of lemma 1)
⇐⇒ x′ /∈ {x′′ ∈ Rd|∃xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′′ − xclean‖ < } and x′ ∈ V B(X )c
⇐⇒ x′ ∈ {x′′ ∈ Rd|@xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′′ − xclean‖ < } and x′ ∈ V B(X )c
⇐⇒ x′ ∈ {x′′ ∈ Rd|∀xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′′ − xclean‖ ≥ } and x′ ∈ V B(X )c
⇐⇒ x′,∀xclean ∈ X¯ : ‖x′ − xclean‖ ≥  and x′ ∈ V B(X )c
Lemma 3. When  > 0, by changing , x′ that satisfies x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c and ‖x′ − x‖ =  can fill up Rd − X¯
except for V B(X ). In other words, (Rd − X¯ ) − V B(X ) ⊂ ⋃
>0
Rgen;exact(). Rgen;exact() is the region of points
that will be used for calculating genuine adversarial accuracy for .
Proof. Part 1
We only consider X 6= ∅ as it is impractical to consider X = ∅. Then, ∃x ∈ X¯ .
x′ ∈ Rd − X¯ =⇒ (‖x′ − x‖ = c > 0) ∨ (‖x′ − x‖ = 0) (∵ Non-negativity axiom of a metric)
=⇒ (‖x′ − x‖ = c > 0) ∨ (x′ = x ∈ X¯ ) (∵ Identity of indiscernibles axiom of a metric)
=⇒ (‖x′ − x‖ = c > 0) ∨ (x′ ∈ X¯ ∩ (Rd − X¯ ) = ∅) =⇒ ‖x′ − x‖ = c > 0
=⇒ x′ ∈ {x′′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′′ − xclean‖ = c where xclean ∈ X¯} for c > 0
=⇒ x′ ∈
⋃
>0
{
x′′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′′ − xclean‖ =  where xclean ∈ X¯
}
=⇒ x′,∃ > 0 : ‖x′ − xclean‖ =  where xclean ∈ X¯
Let min;x′ = min
xclean∈X¯
‖x′ − xclean‖ > 0.
=⇒ x′ ∈ {x′′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′′ − xclean‖ = min;x′ where xclean ∈ X¯} ∩Acmin;x′ (∵ x′ /∈ Amin;x′ )
=⇒ x′ ∈
⋃
>0
({
x′′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′′ − xclean‖ =  where xclean ∈ X¯
} ∩Ac)
We proved the following relation.
Rd − X¯ ⊂
⋃
>0
({
x′′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′′ − x‖ =  where x ∈ X¯} ∩Ac) (5)
Part 2
We finalize the proof of the lemma 3.⋃
>0
Rgen;exact() =
⋃
>0
{
x′ ∈ Xc ∩ V B(X )c| ‖x′ − x‖ =  where x ∈ X¯
}
=
⋃
>0
{
x′ ∈ Ac ∩ V B(X )c| ‖x′ − x‖ =  where x ∈ X¯
}
(∵ Equation (3) of lemma 1)
=
⋃
>0
({
x′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′ − x‖ =  where x ∈ X¯} ∩Ac ∩ V B(X )c)
=
{⋃
>0
({
x′ ∈ Rd| ‖x′ − x‖ =  where x ∈ X¯} ∩Ac)} ∩ V B(X )c (∵ Distributive law)
⊃ (Rd − X¯ )− V B(X ) (∵ Relation (5) )
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Figure 7: Top: Change of genuine adversarial accuracy for f1(x) by maximum perturbation norm ,
Middle: Change of genuine adversarial accuracy for f2(x) by maximum perturbation norm ,
Bottom: Change of genuine adversarial accuracy for f3(x) by maximum perturbation norm .
Details for calculation is omitted.
Combing the fact that Rgen;exact(0) = X and the lemma 3 results in Rd −
(X¯ − X )− V B(X ) ⊂ ⋃
≥0
Rgen;exact().
It indicates that even though genuine adversarial accuracy doesn’t allow overlaps by theorem 1, in practice, genuine
adversarial accuracy uses almost all points in Rd by changing  (Note that X¯ − X and V B(X ) are usually regions with
measure zero in practice.).
8.3 Genuine adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm
Even though the excellences of genuine adversarial accuracy by exact perturbation norm, in practice, it can
be hard to calculate it. That is due to the complex calculation in the projected gradient descent (PGD)
method [14] when non-path-connected regions are used. This problem can be solved when we use gen-
uine adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm because, for each x ∈ X , it uses the intersec-
tion of Ball(x, ) and V or(x) − V B(X ) where Ball(x, ) = {x′ ∈ Rd| ‖x− x′‖ ≤ } and Voronoi cell
V or(x) =
{
x′ ∈ Rd| ‖x− x′‖ ≤ ‖xclean − x′‖ ,∀xclean ∈ X − {x}
}
. The intersection is convex as both Ball(x, )
and V or(x)− V B(X ) are convex. Hence, it is path-connected. When applying projections for the PGD method, one
needs to apply projection on Ball(x, ) first, then apply projection using V or(x)− V B(X ).
Definition 4 (Genuine adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm). We define genuine adversarial
accuracy that uses maximum perturbation norm. Note that 1 () is an indicator function which has value 1 if the
condition in the bracket holds and value 0 if the condition in the bracket doesn’t hold. Voronoi boundary V B(X ) is
defined as
{
x′ ∈ Rd|∃x1, x2 ∈ X¯ : x1 6= x2, ‖x′ − x1‖ = ‖x′ − x2‖
}
.
• Genuine Adversarial accuracy (by maximum perturbation norm):
agen;max() = Ex∈X [1 (f(x∗) = cx)] where x∗ = argmax
x′∈V or(x)−V B(X ):‖x′−x‖≤
L(θ, x′, cx).
Genuine adversarial accuracy by maximum perturbation norm does not satisfy theorem 1, but it satisfies theorem
2 (Proof is omitted, but can be done similarly with the proof of genuine adversarial accuracy by exact perturbation
norm.). As it still satisfies theorem 2, when measuring adversarial robustness of classifiers, it can replace the genuine
adversarial accuracy by exact perturbation norm. Figure 7 shows changes of genuine adversarial accuracy by maximum
perturbation norm for the three classifiers defined in subsection 1.2.1. Decreasing genuine adversarial accuracy by
maximum perturbation norm  indicates that genuine adversarial accuracy by exact perturbation norm  will be smaller
than 1 (In general, the converse of this statement does not hold).
8.4 Optimally robust classifiers when data contain input noise
In our analysis, we assumed the exclusive belongingness assumption in order to simplify the analysis. We describe
optimally robust classifiers when certain input noises were added. Notice that such classifiers can also be used for
12
Proper measure for adversarial robustness A PREPRINT
adversarial training with Voronoi constraints [22] by replacing exclusive labels with soft labels (as optimally robust
classifiers output probabilities). When input noises were added, we can represent that as x = xno-noise + nx where
xno-noise is an original point of the sample x before additive noise nx was added.
Let’s consider the case when noise nx follows Gaussian distribution with zero mean and scalar covariance
matrix σ2I for a fixed σ ≥ 0. As xno-noise = x − nx and Gaussian distribution with zero mean is symmetric with
respect to the zero, we know the distribution of the estimated position of xno-noise. That is Gaussian distribution with
mean x and covariance matrix σ2I . By combing Gaussian distributions, we can get an estimated distribution for each
class c, i.e. p(xno−noise|class = c). (Note that Gaussian distribution is used for each sample and not each class.) If we
assume proper prior probabilities and use Bayes’ theorem, we finally get an estimation of p(class = c|xno−noise)
which will be the optimally robust classifiers for given assumptions about the noise. The classifier is equivalent to the
soft nearest neighbor classifiers introduced by Bermejo and Cabestany [27] or using normalized radial basis function
(RBF) networks [28] for poster probabilities.
Table 1 shows a two-dimensional example with different metrics and varying σ. Notice that we will get dif-
ferent decision boundaries depending on the metrics and noise even though we are using the same data. In addition,
when σ ≈ 0 the optimally robust classifiers resemble the single nearest neighbor classifiers. As σ gets large, the
decision boundaries become more smooth and they can allow misclassifications of some data samples.
Single nearest
neighbor classifiers
(σ = 0)
σ = 0.25 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 σ = 1
l1
norm
l2
norm
l∞
norm
Table 1: Contour plots of optimally robust classifiers for a two-dimensional example when points
(1, 1), (2,−1), (2,−2), (−1,−1) and (−2, 1) were provided for class A: red and points (2, 1), (1,−1), and (0, 0)
were provided for class B: blue. Dashed black curves show decision boundaries for different cases. Figures on the left
show single nearest neighbor classifiers for l1, l2 and l∞ norms. (When σ = 0.25, decision boundaries for l1 and l∞
norms show weird behaviors. It might be due to numerical errors.)
We used distance dependent noise distribution for the distribution of the estimated position of xno-noise in l1 and l∞
norms. In detail, probability density function is defined as c ϕσ(‖t− x‖) where t ∈ Rd is the point that we want to
calculate the density, ϕσ(r) for scalar r is one-dimensional Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation
σ and c is a scaling factor to make intergral over Rd becomes 1. Notice that this formulation is a radial basis function
(RBF) [29] when we use Gaussian distribution as a radial function. The main reason to use RBF was to handle input
noise of the data unlike RBF kernel in support vector machine that can increase the complexity of the classifier [30].
Uniform prior probability is assumed for all cases.
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